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
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


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General Comment

This report is dangerous in that it deals only with the superficial aspects of COMINT processing. Truisms and cliches are profuse throughout the discussions and from them specious conclusions are drawn. Nowhere does the report get down to brass tacks and examine step by step either professionally or expertly the essential elements of COMINT production. For one example, intercept is approached as an organizational problem and is nowhere considered in specific terms of training, experience and proficiency standards of the operator. These are important elements if intercept is to be improved and the intercept organizations should be built to satisfy the requirements stemming from these. Another example is found in the absence of any comments on the diagnostic capabilities of NSA. Successful cryptanalysis depends not only



This aspect is not identifiable in the report

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as written and appears to have been lost in the committee's preoccupation with organizational matters such as super grades, reorganization of USCSB, employment of retired service personnel, ELINT, etc.

A particularly disturbing aspect of the report is that the individuals who prepared it have no experience or background in the field of COMINT production.

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Recommendation No. 1

THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECT USCIB TO ESTABLISH COMINT REQUIREMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF COMINT REALITIES AND CONSIDERATION OF CAPABILITIES OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. THIS OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE TO NSA SHOULD BE SO CLEAR AND SUCCINCT AS TO REQUIRE MINIMUM INTERPRETATION BY THE DIRECTOR, NSA, OF WHAT IS REQUIRED AND ITS DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE. USCIB SHOULD BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH END PRODUCTS AND THE DIRECTOR, NSA SHOULD DETERMINE THE BEST WAY OF PRODUCING THE END PRODUCT. IF USCIB FAILS AFTER A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME TO PROVIDE MORE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE TO THE DIRECTOR, NSA, THEN THE LATTER SHOULD BE MADE A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

CIA Recommendation

Non-concur in the recommendation that National Security Council action is indicated. CIA should reaffirm that the highest priority be given to high level targets and should ask that the USCIB secretariat prepare a complete documentation on past requirements levied upon NSA for these targets. Certainly the availability and quality of other intelligence sources should affect the expression of requirements for COMINT.

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Non-concur that Director NSA need be a member of the IAC in order to obtain proper COMINT requirements.

CIA Comment

This recommendation confuses requirements which are now satisfiable from exploitable sources with those which can only

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be called hopes that currently unreadable ciphers will yield intelligence satisfying high priority needs. The overriding importance of high level [] communications has long been recognized, so much so, that NSA is already devoting more than []

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[] *that*
This is not to say that disposition of its personnel and its internal organization enable NSA to make maximum advantage of its present resources. Another organization can scarcely judge this point and, unfortunately, the Clark Committee did not seriously consider it.

In any event the latest restatement of consumer requirements whose publication is imminent tries very hard to be specific. It can, unfortunately, in no wise help direct effort intelligently in the critical, [] high level communications systems.

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From the specific requirements point of view, USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products. Director, NSA, must not only determine the best way of producing the end product; he must also lay down the cryptanalytic tactics making ultimate success possible. That is, he must decide what cryptanalytic efforts will carry him toward his goal and what preliminary successes are required to open the way to complete solutions.

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The last sentence of this recommendation raises two questions which are unanswered in the report, namely: Who will make the determination that USCIB has failed and that a "reasonable length of time" has passed; and how will membership in the IAC provide the Director, NSA, with better stated requirements? The report alleges that USCIB has not been able to solve this problem even with the Director, NSA, sitting as a qualified member; it therefore does not follow that his membership on the IAC would enable more "clear and succinct" requirements to be established whatever other benefits to him might result from such membership.

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Recommendation No. 2

THAT THE DIRECTOR, NSA, BE GIVEN CLEARCUT DIRECTIVES WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO MAKE MUCH GREATER AND CONTINUING EFFORT TO PRODUCE HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT MONETARY CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE WAIVED AND AN EFFORT AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE MANHATTAN PROJECT SHOULD BE EXERTED AT ONCE.

CIA Recommendation

An all out effort should be made against high-level [] targets. CIA should encourage and support the Director to reorient his efforts wherever necessary for further progress on the primary targets and to limit his efforts against secondary objectives should that be necessary.

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In addition to possible redirection of NSA's effort technically qualified personnel should make further investigation of the reasons for present [] appropriate measures to increase efforts beyond the capacity of present resources. USCIB should review the findings of this investigation to see whether additional support is required.

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CIA Comment

Surely Director, NSA, knows [] [] communications are top priority. It hardly seems that additional [] directives are necessary to emphasize this point. Director, NSA,

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now has full power to tell consumers that lower priority objectives must be sacrificed if he deems it necessary in order to give proper attention to the number one targets. Only NSA can be aware of these areas of effort wherein conflicts between high-level and low-level COMINT exist. It is not proper to shift the responsibility for this decision to the intelligence community. Everybody in Washington knows that as far as cryptanalysis is concerned there is a desperate need for production of [] communications intelligence from [] traffic and that the Director of NSA is the only one who can do anything since he is the only one with the facilities and manpower allocated for this purpose. The most he needs is support in expanding effort and cooperation in necessary retrenchment on secondary targets.

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As for monetary consideration they are indeed secondary to gaining the intelligence and should in no wise inhibit an all out effort. The report unfortunately does not address itself to the reasons for our present [] and therefore one cannot assume that its recommendation will bring about real gains. If more money and people are necessary they should be supplied. However, it would be desirable to have an expert review of the causes of [] and appropriate remedies before undertaking a greatly expanded effort as suggested by the reference to the Manhattan project.

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Recommendation No. 3

THAT ELINT AND COMINT BE INTEGRATED TO THE EXTENT OF PLACING ELINT UNDER NSA FOR ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCT AND GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION IN THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF ELINT. THE AUTHORITY OF OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS OVER THEIR INTEGRAL ELINT RESOURCES, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE ABRIDGED. USCIB OR THE COMBINED BOARD WHICH IS RECOMMENDED IN THIS REPORT TO REPLACE IT SHOULD EXERCISE ONLY POLICY CONTROL OVER ELINT MATTERS.

CIA Recommendation

Non concur

CIA Comment

CIA would prefer to work, for the present, under NSCID 17. Existing plans call for Air Force to be Executive Agent in close cooperation with CIA. If this fails to produce results the matter can be re-examined later.

Recommendation No. 4

THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES AND NSA CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR A HIGHER DEGREE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY; THAT THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, INCLUDING PLAIN TEXT MESSAGES AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTED MESSAGES, BE RESTUDIED BY USCIB (OR THE COMBINED BOARD AS RECOMMENDED BY THIS REPORT) WITH A VIEW TOWARD REDUCING TO THE LOWEST PRACTICABLE LEVEL THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION RELEASED THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS; AND THAT NSC 168 BE REEXAMINED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE DIRECTOR, NSA, HAS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT HIS COMSEC RESPONSIBILITIES.

CIA Recommendation

Concur

CIA Comment

It is more important to ensure the security of our own communications than to try to read foreign communications. Fortunately both of these cryptologic aspects are closely linked together technically so that no conflict arises between them, but they mutually support each other. COMINT certainly indicates that every reasonable and feasible step should be taken to provide the ultimate in communications security for U.S. communications.

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Recommendation No. 5

THAT A SINGLE BOARD WITH APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE POLICY COGNIZANCE OVER COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. IF THE RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE THE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF ELINT UNDER NSA IS ADOPTED, THEN POLICY GUIDANCE FOR ELINT AS WELL AS COMINT AND COMSEC SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY THE PROPOSED SINGLE BOARD.

CIA Recommendation

Non concur

CIA Comment

An old, old question has been revived in this recommendation. USCSB normally deals with problems of a more technical nature than USCIB and in fact, when problems of policy such as improvement of foreign COMSEC is involved, USCIB is drawn automatically into the picture. If this recommendation is accepted USCSB might simply become a subordinate technical panel to USCIB, with the members of USCSB selected from technical circles.

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Recommendation No. 6

THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAREFULLY STUDY THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROPER POSITIONING WITHIN ITS RESPECTIVE SERVICES OF THE THREE CRYPTOLOGIC AGENCIES - AFSS, ASA, AND NSG - WITH A VIEW TOWARD IMPROVING THEIR PRESTIGE AND EFFECTIVENESS, THEREBY STRENGTHENING THEIR PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT POLICIES AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

CIA Recommendation

CIA need neither support nor oppose this recommendation since it is directed to the Secretary of Defense.

CIA Comment

This is not a concern of CIA.

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Recommendation No. 7

THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO SELECTING OFFICERS FOR COMINT DUTIES, ASSIGN REGULAR OR "CAREER" RESERVE OFFICERS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, INDOCTRINATE OFFICERS IN COMINT PRIOR TO SENDING THEM TO COMMAND FIELD STATIONS, AND ESTABLISH CAREER OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPECIALISTS EQUAL TO THOSE OF THE LINE OR GENERAL SERVICE OFFICERS. ROTATION AND REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES SHOULD BE IMPROVED. THE FEASIBILITY OF USING CIVILIAN INTERCEPT OPERATORS SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY TESTED.

IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE CONGRESS ENACT LEGISLATION TO AUTHORIZE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO EMPLOY SPECIALLY QUALIFIED RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL AS PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND WITH NO RESTRICTION ON THE NUMBER SO EMPLOYED. SUCH LEGISLATION SHOULD ALSO PERMIT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO RECALL RETIRED OFFICERS TO ACTIVE DUTY WITH NSA AND HAVE THOSE OFFICERS COUNTED AGAINST THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF NSA BUT NOT OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY SERVICES.

CIA Recommendation

Concur with paragraph 1 and, subject to qualifications indicates below, to paragraph 2.

CIA Comment

With regard to the second part of the recommendation, unless only technically qualified officers are recalled, there is a danger that the NSA may become an "old soldiers home" where

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any retired officer who has had a tour of duty at NSA may be turned out to pasture. If this part of the recommendation is accepted, stringent limitations and checks and controls should be built into the legislation to ensure that only effective personnel of demonstrated technical ability are selected from this category. Normally the services can supply the administrative personnel required by NSA in sufficient quantity without recourse to this device.

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Recommendation No. 8

THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE ALLOCATION OF AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF "SUPER GRADES" AND POSITIONS UNDER PUBLIC LAW 313 TO NSA; TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INDUCEMENTS OR HIGHER PAY TO SELECTED CONSULTANTS; AND TO PRIVILEGES EXTENDED TO CIVILIANS OVERSEAS.

CIA Recommendation

CIA need neither support nor oppose this recommendation since it is directed to the Secretary of Defense.

CIA Comment

There is no question but that NSA should have access to a fair share of the so-called super grades. It would appear, however, that the administrative machinery set up within the government would be the proper mechanism for use in determining the number and grades of such positions as NSA requires. This is a job for the Director of NSA and involves the justification of the positions and the procurement of support from the Department of Defense for such positions.

NSA has recently receives a large number of super grades and every inducement should be provided to obtain the necessary consultants particularly in connection with recommendation 2.

Equitable treatment for NSA civilians who are assigned overseas is, of course, indicated.

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Recommendation No. 9

THAT USCIB OR ITS SUCCESSOR BOARD CLARIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON DETACHMENTS WITH NSA, ESTABLISH UNIFORM PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY SUCH DETACHMENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT AGENCY, AND SPECIFY MAXIMUM NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL TO BE ASSIGNED FOR LIAISON DUTIES AFTER EXAMINING THE EXTENT OF INTEREST OF EACH DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY CONCERNED. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO LIAISON DUTY WITH NSA SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ATTEND AN INDOCTRINATION COURSE CONDUCTED BY NSA.

CIA Recommendation

Generally concur with this recommendation. The nature and scope of liaison must be determined in the light of the requirements of all agencies. Care must be taken that no arrangements be agreed upon which would stifle the liaison necessary for the NSA analyst on one one hand and the consumer analyst on the other.

CIA Comment

For NSA to be most effective as a service organization information must flow freely between the consumer agencies and NSA. The most appropriate relationship between consumer and service organizations has long been a most vexing and controversial problem. The pendulum has swung back and forth between "no liaison" and "complete liaison" several times within the history of COMINT.

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The basic problem found here is one of human behavior which only time can resolve. The two important factors involved are the intelligent selection of liaison personnel and NSA's attitude toward them as individuals.

As to the number of liaison personnel the report confuses liaison personnel with those engaged in evaluation or those assigned to NSA as working bodies. True liaison is conducted by relatively few people; in fact CIA has 5 not 23 in this capacity. It would be difficult as well as pointless to specify a fixed number of liaison personnel as the varying quantity and quality of COMINT produced by NSA determines the number required at a particular time for this work.

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Recommendation No. 10

**THAT NSA AND THE THREE CRYPTOLOGIC SERVICES
GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO, AND CONTINUE TO DEVELOP
MUTUAL COOPERATION IN, IMPROVING THE TECHNICAL
FEATURES OF INTERCEPT STATIONS.**

CIA Recommendation

Concur

CIA Comment

**This recommendation is basically sound and we should strive
for standardization wherever such is feasible and desirable, and
should take into consideration the specific requirements of the
problems. It should be kept in mind, however, that standardization
should not be an "across the board" requirement for all services.
Advantages accruing from standardization within, say the Army,
might be lost in the Navy, Air Force and CIA if those services
were required to accept the Army standards.**

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Recommendation No. 11

THAT MORE THOROUGH PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONS OF PERSONNEL BE MADE. PARTICULAR EFFORT SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON PERSONS OCCUPYING THE MORE SENSITIVE POSITIONS.

CIA Recommendation

Concur

CIA Comment

This matter is already under study by a special committee of USCIB, and CIA is assigning its Chief Security Officer to this Committee.

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Recommendation No. 12

**THAT THE DIRECTOR, NSA, BE GIVEN AUTHORITY
TO INSPECT THE SERVICE CRYPTOLOGIC SCHOOLS AND
MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVE-
MENT WHERE COMINT IS AFFECTED.**

CIA Recommendations

Concur

CIA Comment

**The principles involved are good since this will permit
NSA to ensure that proper training is being given.**



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